LORD ESHER, M.R. It is clear that very large interests are involved in the decision of this case, and that it is one that demands great care, but in the end I feel bound to construe the Acts of Parliament on which our decision turns according to the ordinary rules of construction. It is plain that if the discretion which is claimed to be vested in the magistrates is not exercised with the greatest care irreparable injury and in some cases injustice may be done.

We have to construe several Acts, the first of which is the Licensing Act, 1828, under which the case is stated. The justices

stated the grounds on which they went, and the court of quarter sessions upheld their decision. The question asked is, whether the justices or the court of quarter sessions had jurisdiction in respect of either of the objections, because if they had jurisdiction as to one of them that is sufficient to support their decision. Now what is the rule of construction to be applied? It is that the words of a statute must be construed as they would have been the day after the statute was passed, unless some subsequent statute has declared that some other construction is to be adopted or has altered the previous statute.

Now the Licensing Act, 1828, constitutes special licensing sessions of the justices of the peace in every division for the purpose of granting - not excise licences but - magistrates' licences to persons keeping or being about to keep inns, alehouses, or victualling houses, to sell excisable liquor by retail, to be drunk or consumed on the premises therein specified. It is impossible to suppose but that the legislature must have foreseen that if such licences were to be granted annually they would apply to two classes of houses, either a house requiring a licence for the first time, or a house in respect of which a licence by way of renewal is asked for. I say by way of renewal, for although it may not be correct in point of law to call it a renewal, as the licence only lasts for a year and then expires, it is a convenient form of expression. The word "grant" is used as to the obtaining licences for both these classes of houses and the same discretion is given to the justices in both cases: there is no distinction between them, and that discretion is, in terms, unlimited. In every case therefore of renewal under this statute there is an unlimited judicial discretion as to the granting of the licence, subject to an appeal under s. 27 to the court of quarter sessions, which is to have the same power as had been conferred on the licensing justices.

The next question is whether in any other statute is to be found any legislation that alters the previously existing law. By the Licensing Act, 1872, s. 42, provision is made for the renewal of a licence. The application is made under the former Act, but the person making it need not attend in person unless he is required by the licensing justices so to attend. That certainly does not affect the discretion of the justices, nor does the 2nd

sub-section, which relates to the giving a seven-day notice, or, in the absence of such notice, to the adjournment of the case. The 3rd sub-section relates to evidence being given on oath, and then "subject as aforesaid," that is subject to these regulations as to the hearing and adjudication, "the powers and discretion of the justices relative to such renewal shall be exercised as heretofore." So, far, then as this statute is concerned the discretion of the justices is not affected.

But then s. 26 of the Licensing Act, 1874, deals with s. 42 of the Licensing Act, 1872, and limits the power of the justices to require the personal attendance of the applicant to cases in which there is some special cause personal to the applicant. This can have no effect on the question of the discretion of the justices, as it is confined to their power to insist on personal attendance.

On this view of the statute there is an end of the case, and we need not consider any of the cases or the other Acts that have been cited, but I may say that s. 19 of the Beerhouse Act, 1869, supports the view I have taken, though it is not necessary to rely on it.

I think, therefore, that this appeal must be dismissed.

FRY, L.J. This case is one of so great importance that it is right I should say a few words in expressing my judgment upon the matter. With the conclusions arrived at by the Master of the Rolls I entirely concur. We have, I think, no need to go behind the statute of 1828. The earlier history of licensed public-houses or beerhouses in this country is immaterial for the purpose of construing that statute. We find there that the legislature required a special session of the justices to be held for the purpose of granting licences to persons keeping or about to keep inns, ale-houses, and victualling-houses for the sale of excisable liquors. Now it is obvious that two classes of persons are referred to - those who at the time the sessions are held actually keep houses and desire the renewal of their licences, and those persons who are not keeping houses, but who are desirous of keeping, or are about to keep houses, if they can obtain licences - persons, therefore, who were applying for their first licences. The power vested in the magistrates assembled at such meetings

is (I am reading the clause shortly) to grant licences for the purposes aforesaid to such persons "as they (the said justices) shall in the execution of the powers herein contained and in the exercise of their discretion, deem fit and proper." Nothing is to my mind more plain than that the exercise of the discretion is one and the same with regard to the persons who are keeping and the persons who are about to keep public-houses. No distinction is drawn between the two classes. Their existence as separate classes, if you like so to say, is recognised; the jurisdiction and power of the magistrates are alike in both cases, and the discretion is alike in both cases. The only doubt which, it seems to me, can be raised upon the construction of the words which I have read arises from the collocation of the words "such persons as the justices in their discretion shall deem fit and proper." It might have been said, and has been said, I believe, in the case to which I am about to refer, that that confines the discretion of the justices to the character of the person; but when the 9th section of the statute is looked at, it is seen that that no such contention is tenable for a moment. The discretion is of a much wider character. That was fully, and, to my mind, most satisfactorily explained by Lush, J., in giving the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench in the case of  Reg. v. Justices of Lancashire. ⁽¹⁾ Having adverted to the points which I have just referred to, he says: "It is therefore obvious that the words relied on by the appellant point not merely to the merits of the applicant, but must be read in a wider sense, as referring to the merits of the application; and they authorize, and therefore by implication require the justices to govern their discretion, in granting or withholding the licence, by reference not only to the qualification of the persons applying and to the suitableness of the house, but to other considerations also. Those considerations must include the nature of the locality, the population, the number of houses already licensed, and all other circumstances bearing on the question, whether it is fit and proper in the interests of the public, for whose benefit these Acts are passed, that an additional licence should be granted." Now that the discretion to be exercised in the case of the second application

to renew, if you like to so call it, and the first application is the same, I have already said, to my mind is apparent from the structure of the statute itself. That view is expressed as being undoubted law by Cockburn, C.J., in the case of  Reg. v. Smith ⁽¹⁾,where he referred to the statute of George IV. as one "whereby there was the same discretion given to the justices whether the licence asked for was a new one or by way of renewal." Now if that plain construction of the statute and that authority required any confirmation, I should find it in the statute of 1869, because ss. 8 and 19 to my mind do import, or tend to import, that the legislature conceived the magistrates to have an unlimited judicial discretion in the case of renewals, and in the case of renewals the same discretion that they had in cases of first grants, and that by those sections the legislature desired in particular cases to limit that discretion. I think, therefore, the plain conclusion to be drawn is that the statute of 1828 created the same discretion in the justices in cases of renewal as in cases of first grant.

We have, therefore, to consider whether the subsequent legislation has in any way taken away or diminished that discretion. It is to be borne in mind that in the year 1869 the legislation was passed to which I have already referred, and that that had the effect of bringing the holders of beerhouse licences under the jurisdiction of the magistrates, and bringing them, to a considerable extent, within the operation of the statute of 1828, although with certain important differences. Now one of the provisions of the statute of 1828, namely, the 12th section, required the attendance of the applicants; and it seems that by parity of legislation the beerhouse holders were also required to attend, and the results of that are stated, and I have no doubt stated accurately, to have been inconvenient. In 1872 the legislature passed an Act which in many important particulars dealt with these licences. It took away the right of appeal in the case of all first applications for a licence, whether the magistrates refused or granted those applications; it retained the right of an appeal only in cases of renewal. The legislature introduced the disqualification of premises, that is to say, it rendered in certain

cases the property itself incapable of being that in respect of which licences could be granted to any person, and it introduced corresponding clauses enabling the owner of property to protect himself against such disqualification. Now I refer to those clauses only because our attention has been drawn to them by Mr. Candy, who has desired to say that the Act of 1872 was intended to protect, as he would say, the vested interests of the licence-holder. It seems to me that nothing of the sort can be safely predicated of that Act. It introduces a good many things against licence-holders, and it naturally introduces certain provisions to enable the persons who were affected by the earlier provisions to defend themselves. We have therefore, I think, really only to deal with the 42nd section of the statute of 1872. It seems to me that the object of the section was simply to alter the procedure. It was to get rid of the attendance of the crowd of people who came to the annual brewster sessions. It was, in the next place, to introduce certain provisions for dealing with objections which might nevertheless be taken, but could not be taken fairly in the absence of the persons who were affected. Lastly, it required that evidence in cases of renewals should be given on oath; and then, having provided for these things, the section said this, "Subject as aforesaid licences shall be renewed, and the power and discretion of justices relative to such renewal shall be exercised as heretofore." In other words, it said the discretion given by the Act of 1828, which was the same in the case of renewals as in the case of first grants, was still to be exercised in the case of renewals. That, I think, is the plain, obvious sense of that section. Then comes the last piece of legislation with which it is necessary to deal - the statute of 1874. This is strictly an amending statute. It is mainly occupied with amendments of the Act of 1872. I presume that in the working of the extensive alterations which were introduced into the law by the statute of 1872 certain difficulties or defects had been discovered. It is to get over those difficulties and heal those defects that the statute of 1874 was passed, and accordingly it describes the Act of 1872 as the principal Act, and enacts that the Acts of 1872 and 1874 shall, so far as is consistent with the tenor of the Acts, be construed as one Act. Then we come to the 26th section, which

recites s. 42 of the earlier Act, and is plainly only a section amending s. 42. It enacts that the requisition, which is the first part of s. 42, shall not be made save for "some special cause personal to the licensed person to whom such requisition is sent." I confess those words are the only ones which have caused me any perplexity in the present case. It might seem that the word "personal" is used strictly in its proper signification; that the cause of objection must be something in the person of the applicant. That would go to exclude the discretion of the justices in everything except an objection to the personal character of the man. It would shut out the character of the house; it would shut out the consideration of the surrounding circumstances; the character of the edifice, its remoteness from police supervision, and everything which might have reference to the interests of the public, except only the individual character of the man. That might have been the meaning of the words, but in my judgment that is not their meaning. I think that it is impossible to suppose that if it was intended to introduce such a revolution as I have referred to in the power of the justices of granting renewals, some explicit words would not have been used. I think that the true meaning of those words is, that the justices shall not give general notices to all the publicans who apply at the sessions to attend them. We are told, and I daresay accurately, that that had been the practice at some quarter sessions between the Act of 1872 and the Act of 1874, and the meaning is, "You shall not give these general notices, but you must consider the case of each individual, and the notice given must be something which relates to the individual or to his house, and to his case in particular, and not to all publicans in general." I am induced to come to that conclusion for several reasons. I have already adverted to one, that I think that such an enormous change in the jurisdiction of the magistrates as is suggested would be too much to put upon those words. Another reason is this: Towards the end of the section I find a provision that the notice of the intention to oppose shall state in general terms the grounds upon which the renewal of such licence is to be opposed. Now observe; if it be true that the ground of character only is to be taken, instead of there being grounds on which the renewal of such licence can be opposed, they are all reduced to one, yet here the legislature refers to the

grounds without saying that they are any less numerous or less wide than they were before the section was passed. Again, and this is perhaps what influenced me more than anything else - I am bound to read the two Acts and the two sections together, and reading them together they come to this: The 1st sub-section of s. 42 must be read in this way - he need not attend in person at the general annual licensing meeting unless he is required by the licensing justices so to attend for "some special cause personal to the licensed person to whom such requisition is sent." The second clause about entertaining the objection must be amended by adding after the words "to oppose the renewal of such licence," "stating in general terms the grounds upon which the renewal of such licence is to be opposed." Those amended sub-sections are still followed (because it is all one Act) by the concluding words of s. 42, "subject as aforesaid licences shall be renewed, and the powers and discretion of justices relative to such renewal shall be exercised as heretofore." If the legislature had meant to amend s. 42 by limiting that discretion which they had retained and maintained in the statute of 1872, you would have found unquestionably words addressed to that portion of the section. But as they stand they must be read, as subject, and subject only, to the particular provisions of s. 42 as modified by this s. 26 in the Act of 1874. For these reasons I am clearly of opinion that the decision of the Divisional Court is right.

LOPES, L.J. I am of the same opinion. The Act of 1828, on which, in my view, the question of the authority of the justices in this case turns, was applicable, not merely to the state of things which was in existence when it was passed, but was intended to govern future applications until the Act was repealed or altered. The Act has been dealt with by subsequent legislation, but this particular matter of the discretion of the justices in a case like the present has not been interfered with. The justices, therefore, had jurisdiction, and the appeal should be dismissed.